After my last post, some of you are probably thinking that it's easy to be a critic, but what would I suggest instead? The answer is simple to name but difficult to implement.
- Operate a defensible network architecture. Hardly anyone does. I don't need to explain all of the reasons why here; they could occupy a series of posts, or maybe even a book.
- Once the DNA is operating, detect and respond to failures. The nice aspect of operating a DNA is that the number of failures should be lower but of higher complexity. Unfortunately at the moment almost all of the world's detection and response teams have to deal with the entire spectrum of security incidents. These range from the most mundane to the most complex. Too often the mundane hide the complex, or at the very least divert resources and attention.
- Use the knowledge learned from failures (either caused by adversaries or adversary simulation) to guide the next version of the DNA. Since most enterprises are not operating a DNA, they never get to work on the next version anyway.
I know other people think this way too. Harlan Carvey is one. He is also an incident responder and he finds so many clients that are not doing the basics anywhere remotely right.
Richard Bejtlich is teaching new classes in Las Vegas in 2009. Regular Las Vegas registration ends 1 July.
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