Rabu, 31 Agustus 2005

Changes Ahead for FreeBSD LiveCDs

There's plenty of activity in FreeBSD-land these days. Colin Percival has become the new FreeBSD Security Officer. FreeBSD 6.0-BETA3 is available, and we might see 6.0-RELEASE by late September.

I just learned of a new FreeBSD LiveCD by Matt Olander called BSDLive, which fits on a business card CD (media sleeve available). This is a great advocacy item. I booted the .iso in VMWare and saw it runs FreeBSD 5.4-RELEASE-p6. It boots into X.org 6.8.2.

I will be glad when the results of the logo contest are announced!

One cannot talk about FreeBSD LiveCDs without mentioning FreeSBIE. Unfortunately, the last official release happened in December. Sguil 0.5.3 is only one day younger! However, a look at the FreeSBIE mailing list shows that Dario Freni is busy working on integrating FreeSBIE into the main FreeBSD source tree. I do not think we will see this in 6.0, but perhaps 6-STABLE will have it shortly after 6.0.

Frenzy is an alternative FreeBSD LiveCD that I have not yet tried. Frenzy 0.3 is based on FreeBSD 5.2.1 (fairly old), but a version using 5.4 appears to be available soon.

I look forward to seeing FreeSBIE integrated into the source tree, as that will undoubtedly make it easier to create FreeBSD LiveCDs.

Selasa, 30 Agustus 2005

Interview with Def Con CTF Winning Team Member Vika Felmetsger

Earlier this month I congratulated the Def Con Capture The Flag winners from Giovanni Vigna's team. One of the contestants, Vika Felmetsger, was kind enough to answer questions about her experience and the role she played on team Shellphish. I thought I would publish Vika's thoughts in the hopes that she could provide an example of how one becomes a serious security practitioner.


Richard (R): What is your experience with security, and what are your interests?

Vika (V): I am starting my second year as a computer science Ph. D. student at UCSB, where I work as a research assistant in the Reliable Software Group (RSG).

Everybody in the group works on various computer security areas and my current focus is web application security. Even though now security is a part of my everyday life, I am still pretty new to this area.

As an undergraduate student at UCSB I learned some security basics, however, my real introduction to practical security, and hacking in particular, was last fall when I took "Network Security and Intrusion Detection," which is a class taught by my graduate advisor Prof. Giovanni Vigna.

In this class I learned various techniques that can be used to break the security of computer systems, how to detect attacks, and how to protect a system against possible attacks.

Most importantly, as a part of the classwork, every student was able to apply the learned techniques to write actual exploits to attack various vulnerabilities in real programs within a testbed network.

Also, during the class, I participated in two Capture The Flag (CTF) exercises (which are organized every year by Prof. Vigna) where, together with other students in the class, I could practice attacking other systems as well as defending my team's system. As a result, after that class, I had the background necessary to further develop my hacking skills on my own as well as be able to work on various security problems.

Later I was very lucky to be involved in setting up the UCSB International CTF which was organized by Prof. Vigna on June 10th, 2005. This provided me with a valuable experience being on the organizers' side and helped me to improve my system administration, networking, and network traffic analysis skills.

R: How did you join team Shellphish?

V: Hmmm, I did not really join the team ... Everybody in the RSG is a member of the Shellphish team :-).

R: Did you have a specific role on the team? If yes, can you describe it?

V: During the DefCon CTF I was a "human IDS." I was analyzing (using scripts and manually) network traffic in real time looking for attacks on our system. This helped the team to discover many successful attacks on our system, find out which particular vulnerabilities were exploited, patch the system, and even reuse some of the attacks against the other teams.

[Note: Against sophisticated intruders, only human analysts can prevail.]

R: What was it like to compete at Def Con? Did it meet your expectations?

V: I was dreaming about competing at DefCon the whole year and it certainly met my best expectations! :-) I don't have enough words to describe the feeling that I had sitting 3 days straight in front of the computer when I was absolutely consumed by the game. That is something everybody should experience for him/herself ;-).

I was very lucky to be a part of such an amazing team, to work together with the people whom I highly respect and from whom I have so many things to learn. What can be better?

When we came to DefCon this year, we did not care that much about winning, we simply wanted to enjoy ourselves doing the things that everybody in the team is fascinated with. And, it certainly worked out perfectly!

R: Do you plan to compete next year?

V: Of course.

R: What advice could you give to those who might like to compete, or have skills like yours?

V: Well, I am probably not the best person to give advices right now because I am still have a long way to go myself, but if you ask ;-) ...

Knowing theory is not enough, you need to practice everything that you read about hacking or security (I don't mean attacking real systems, of course ;-).

There are many ways to do it, for example, install known vulnerable software on your own machine and write an exploit for it.

Also, even if you don't think that you have enough skills to actually compete at Defcon, sign up for the quals anyway and try it for yourself.

From my own experience, I can say that I learned many practical things from this year quals, not to mention that it was incredibly fun :-). Also, what I am planning on working now is to improve my scripting skills which are very important when competing in real time.


Thanks to Vika for responding to my questions.

If you like these sorts of interviews, let me know. I plan to incorporate these sorts of stories into the TaoSecurity Podcast, when I get time to launch it.

Request for Help with OpenPacket.org

Earlier this month I announced work on OpenPacket.org, a free site providing quality network traffic traces to researchers, analysts, and other members of the digital security community.

We are looking for help in two areas:

  1. Open source content management systems (CMS) experience: We believe we will use a CMS to accept, moderate, and present traffic captures to users. We need help planning and deploying a CMS that will meet our needs.

  2. Open source database experience: We will use an open source database like MySQL or PostgreSQL, as compatible with the CMS we choose. We need help planning and deploying a database schema, and we will need guidance on configuring the database properly. Most of the OpenPacket.org crew has database experience as it relates to supporting intrusion detection sensors, but storing and retrieving the sorts of data we have in mind is probably outside our daily routine.


We have ideas for additional OpenPacket.org functionality, but providing ways to accept, moderate, and present traces in Libpcap format is the primary goal of our first version of OpenPacket.org.

If you are interested in helping with either subject, please email richard at taosecurity dot com.

If you have any comments, as always they are welcome here. Thank you.

Senin, 29 Agustus 2005

How Do You Use Taps?

How do you use taps? Specifically, do any of you use Net Optics taps? If yes, I would like to speak with you through email. I'm interested in your thoughts on any of these subjects:

  • How did you justify buying these products?

  • Did you encounter any installation issues?

  • How are you using taps?

  • What alternatives did you consider?

  • Did taps help you learn more about any intrusions, or help you prevent or mitigate intrusions?


I appreciate any feedback you might have. Please email richard at taosecurity dot com. Thank you.

Speaking at Net Optics Think Tank on 21 September

I will be speaking at the next Net Optics Think Tank at the Hilton Santa Clara in Santa Clara, CA on 21 September 2005. I will discuss network forensics, with a preview of material in my next two books, Real Digital Forensics and Extrusion Detection: Security Monitoring for Internal Intrusions. I had a good time speaking at the last Think Tank, where I met several blog readers.

Minggu, 28 Agustus 2005

Real Threat Reporting

In an environment where too many people think that flaws in SSH or IIS are "threats," (they're vulnerabilities), it's cool to read a story about real threats. Nathan Thornbourgh's story in Time, The Invasion Of The Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried to Stop Them), examines Titan Rain, a so-called "cyberespionage ring" first mentioned by Bradley Graham in last week's Washington Post.

The Time story centers on Shawn Carpenter, an ex-Navy and now ex-Sandia National Laboratories security analyst. The story says:

"As he had almost every night for the previous four months, he worked at his secret volunteer job until dawn, not as Shawn Carpenter, mid-level analyst, but as Spiderman—the apt nickname his military-intelligence handlers gave him—tirelessly pursuing a group of suspected Chinese cyberspies all over the world. Inside the machines, on a mission he believed the U.S. government supported, he clung unseen to the walls of their chat rooms and servers, secretly recording every move the snoopers made, passing the information to the Army and later to the FBI.

The hackers he was stalking, part of a cyberespionage ring that federal investigators code-named Titan Rain, first caught Carpenter's eye a year earlier when he helped investigate a network break-in at Lockheed Martin in September 2003. A strikingly similar attack hit Sandia several months later, but it wasn't until Carpenter compared notes with a counterpart in Army cyberintelligence that he suspected the scope of the threat. Methodical and voracious, these hackers wanted all the files they could find, and they were getting them by penetrating secure computer networks at the country's most sensitive military bases, defense contractors and aerospace companies."

I read this and thought, "Whoa, this guy is saying too much. Game over for him." Then I read this:

"[T]he Army passed Carpenter and his late-night operation to the FBI. He says he was a confidential informant for the FBI for the next five months. Reports from his cybersurveillance eventually reached the highest levels of the bureau's counterintelligence division, which says his work was folded into an existing task force on the attacks. But his FBI connection didn't help when his employers at Sandia found out what he was doing. They fired him and stripped him of his Q clearance, the Department of Energy equivalent of top-secret clearance. Carpenter's after-hours sleuthing, they said, was an inappropriate use of confidential information he had gathered at his day job. Under U.S. law, it is illegal for Americans to hack into foreign computers.

Carpenter is speaking out about his case, he says, not just because he feels personally maligned—although he filed suit in New Mexico last week for defamation and wrongful termination. The FBI has acknowledged working with him: evidence collected by TIME shows that FBI agents repeatedly assured him he was providing important information to them. Less clear is whether he was sleuthing with the tacit consent of the government or operating as a rogue hacker. At the same time, the bureau was also investigating his actions before ultimately deciding not to prosecute him."

Now I understand why Time has all these details!

I would like more technical clarification of this point:

"When he uncovered the Titan Rain routers in Guangdong, he carefully installed a homemade bugging code in the primary router's software. It sent him an e-mail alert at an anonymous Yahoo! account every time the gang made a move on the Net. Within two weeks, his Yahoo! account was filled with almost 23,000 messages, one for each connection the Titan Rain router made in its quest for files."

What does this mean? It sounds like Carpenter took control of the routers and then, what?

I cite this story because it talks about how sophisticated threats operate:

"Carpenter had never seen hackers work so quickly, with such a sense of purpose. They would commandeer a hidden section of a hard drive, zip up as many files as possible and immediately transmit the data to way stations in South Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan before sending them to mainland China. They always made a silent escape, wiping their electronic fingerprints clean and leaving behind an almost undetectable beacon allowing them to re-enter the machine at will. An entire attack took 10 to 30 minutes."

That's how professionals work.

Sabtu, 27 Agustus 2005

Teaching Pentagon Security Analysts with Special Ops Security

Prior to attending the IAM class this week, I spent two days teaching security analysts from the Pentagon with instructors from Special Ops Security. (The class was four days, but I was only present for the first two.) I think we offered some unique perspectives on security. Steve Andres, author of Security Sage's Guide to Hardening the Network Infrastructure spoke about hardening network infrastructure on day one. I taught network security monitoring on day two, with hands-on labs. Erik Birkholz, author of Special Ops: Host and Network Security for Microsoft, Unix, and Oracle taught methods to attack Windows systems on day three. Concluding with day four, SQL Server Security author Chip Andrews taught Web application security.

In addition to getting a copy of Erik's book, class attendees also received individually numbered challenge coins. This was Steve's idea. A challenge coin is usually a unit-specific coin that military members should carry at all times. The reasons why are documented at the previous link. As one might expect with the military, an excuse to buy a drink is usually involved. (The same goes for wearing a hat backwards, and so on.)

My coin is pictured here. Through a total act of good karma, Steve gave me coin 41. He didn't know that 41 was my favorite number (aside from the "94" that my USAFA training burned into my brain). I use 41 on my hockey jerseys since it was the number I was given on my high school cross-country team. Thanks Steve, and Special Ops Security! We'll most likely teach this multi-discplinary course again. Contact me via richard at taosecurity dot com if you're interested.