Rabu, 30 Juli 2008

Snort Report 17 Posted

My 17th Snort Report titled How to find new features in Snort 2.8.2 has been posted. It was delayed in production for a while but it still applies to Snort 2.8.2.1. From the article:

Service provider takeaway: Service providers will learn about new features in Snort 2.8.2 that they can deploy at customer sites.

The last time we looked at new Snort options occurred with Snort 2.8.0, released in late September 2007. Since then, Snort 2.8.0.1, 2.8.0.2 and 2.8.1 have been published. At the time of writing, Snort 2.8.2-8-rc1 is the latest version, although release candidate versions should generally not be deployed in production environments. However, RC editions do provide a look at the newest elements of Snort available to the general public. This Snort Report provides an overview of some of the new features in the latest editions of Snort while explaining how to identify these new features.


I'm working on a new Snort Report now looking at the new SSP Beta 2.

Selasa, 29 Juli 2008

Counterintelligence: Worse than Security?

As a former Air Force intelligence officer, I'm very interested in counterintelligence. I've written about counterintelligence and the cyber-threat before. I'm reading a book about counterintelligence failures, and the following occurred to me. It is seldom in the self-interest of any single individual, department, or agency to identify homegrown spies. In other words, hardly anyone in the CIA wants to find a Russian spy working at Langley. If you disagree, examine the history of any agency suffering similar breaches. It isn't pretty; the degree to which people deny reality and then seek to cover it up is incredible.

In some ways this make sense. Nothing good comes from identifying a spy, other than (hopefully) a damage assessment of the spy's impact. Overall the national security of the country can be incredibly damaged, never mind the lives lost or harmed by the spy's actions. However, in case after case, the appeal to higher national security interests is frequently buried.

Reading this book, it also occurred to me that security has exactly the same problem. Spies are worse in most respects, and they could be equated to insider threats. However, just as with spies, in security it is seldom in the self-interest of any single individual, department, or agency to identify compromises. Despite the fact that an intruder is the perpetrator, the victim is often blamed for security breaches. The word "security failure" demonstrates that something bad has happened, so it must be the fault of the IT and security groups. (Imagine if a mugging was called a "personal security failure.")

Because of this reality, it seems that the only way to counter these self-interests is to task a central group, organizationally detached from the individual agencies, with identifying security breaches. In CI, this should be the job of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), but the Office of the Director of National Intelligence appears to have neutered the NCIX. In digital security, a headquarters-level group should independently assess the security of its constituents. These central groups must have the support of top management, or they will be ineffective.

Update: Fixed the "seldom" problem!

Security Operations: Do You CAER?

Security operations can be reduced to four main tasks. A mature security operation performs all four tasks proactively.

  1. Collection is the process of acquiring the evidence necessary to identify activity of interest.

  2. Analysis is the process of investigating evidence to identify suspicious and malicious activity that could qualify as incidents.

  3. Escalation is the process of reporting incidents to responsible parties.

  4. Resolution is the process of handling incidents to recover to a desired state.


The goal of every mature security operation is to reduce the mean time to resolution, i.e., accomplishing all four tasks as quickly and efficiently as possible.

As has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Anton Chuvakin's Blog), some organizations which aren't even performing collection yet view achieving that first step as their end goal. ("Whew, we got the logs. Check!") Collecting evidence is no easy task, to be sure. Increasingly the logs generated by security devices are less relevant to real investigations. Application-level data can sometimes be the only way to understand what is happening, yet programmers aren't really practicing security application instrumentation by building visibility in (yet).

Various regulatory frameworks are beginning to drive recalcitrant organizations further into security operations by requiring analysis and not just collection. Besides meeting legal requirements, it should be obvious that identifying security failures as early as possible reduces the ultimate cost of resolving those problems, just as purging bugs from software early in the development process is cheaper than developing patches for software in the field. Competent analysis is probably the most difficult aspect of security operations. Understanding applications, the environment, and attack models is increasingly difficult, and the human resources to perform this task well are seldom inexpensive nor willing to relocate in large numbers.

Assuming one has the capability to do decent enough analysis to discover trouble, knowing whom to notify (escalation) becomes the next step. In a large organization this is no trivial task. Simply performing asset inventory, naming responsible parties, and establishing incident response procedures is a project unto itself. Worse, none of these details are static. Any system which depends upon administrators to manually enumerate their networks, data, systems, applications, and personal information will become stale within days. These processes should be automated, so a human incident handler can escalate without wasting time tracking down missing information.

Finally we come to resolution. Several problems arise here. First, the "responsible" party may deny the incident, despite evidence to the contrary. Although providing evidence may help, in some cases the "responsible" party may ignore the incident handler while quietly recovering from the event. Second, the "responsible" party may ignore the incident. The person may simply not care at all, or not care enough to direct the resources needed to resolve the incident. Third, the responsible party may want to resolve the incident, but may not be politically or technically capable for doing so. All three cases justify giving incident handlers the authority and knowledge to guide incident resolution as needed, to include deploying an augmentation team in serious cases.

Note that an organization may be forced to do escalation and resolution even when it does no collection or analysis. External parties, like law enforcement, the military, customers, regulators, and peers are frequently informing organizations that they have been compromised. This is a very poor situation, because a victim not doing independent collection and analysis has few options when the cops come knocking. Usually administrators must scramble to salvage whatever data might exist, wasting time as log sources (which may not even exist) are located. Resources to make sense of the data are lacking, so the victim is helpless. Management unwilling to support a security operation are going to be flummoxed when confronted by a serious incident. More time will be wasted. The only winner is the intruder.

Avoiding this situation requires us to fully CAER. It's cheaper, faster, and at some point I believe will be demanded by the government and market anyway.

Senin, 28 Juli 2008

Notes for Black Hat Students

The following is directed at students of my TCP/IP Weapons School (TWS) at Black Hat USA 2008 on 2-3 and 4-5 August 2008, at Caesars Palace, Las Vegas, NV. Please disregard otherwise.

TWS is an advanced network traffic analysis class. We expect students to have some experience looking at network traffic using tools like Wireshark. We also expect students to have some experience working in Unix-like operating systems.

We want you to get the most value from TWS. Students may participate in three ways.

  1. Students may simply observe while the instructor explains the network traffic and attacks which generated the traces. Students do not need anything to enjoy this aspect of the class.

  2. Students are encouraged to review traces as the instructor explains the network traffic and attacks. Students will need a laptop running Wireshark and a DVD drive to enjoy this aspect of the class.

  3. Students are encouraged to perform hands-on exercises which demonstrate tools and techniques to create interesting network traffic. Students will need a laptop with 10 GB free and a DVD drive.

    The laptop must have a VMware product installed. The instructor tested the VMs with VMware Server 1.0.6 on Ubuntu 8.04 and Windows XPSP2. The instructor expects the VMs to work on VMware Player (free), VMware Workstation (not free) and VMware Fusion (not free), although they were not tested. Students are strongly discouraged from relying on VMware Player, which only allows one VM to run at a time. Students will receive 3 VMs, and some labs require all 3 to be running simultaenously.

    At least one of the VMs is compressed using the 7z format. Windows users can use 7-zip and Unix-like users can use p7zip to extract the VM(s).


We hope you choose to participate by examining network traces using Wireshark and running the labs, so please bring the appropriate software and hardware to class. Extracting the VMs from the DVD may take an hour or more depending on hardware speeds, so hands-on labs will not start until late morning or early afternoon of the first day of class.

If you have any questions, please email taosecurity -at- gmail -dot- com.

Sabtu, 26 Juli 2008

Review of The New School of Information Security Posted

Amazon.com just published my four star review of The New School of Information Security by Adam Shostack and Andrew Stewart. From the review:

If you don't "get" Allan Schiffman's 2004 phrase "amateurs study cryptography; professionals study economics," if you don't know who Prof. Ross Anderson is, and if you think anti-virus and a firewall are required simply because they are "best practices," you need to read The New School of Information Security (TNSOIS). If you already recognize why I highlight these issues, you will not find much beyond an explanation of these central tenets in TNSOIS.

Review of Nmap Network Scanning

Recently Fyodor sent me a pre-publication review copy of his new self-published book Nmap Network Scanning (NNS). I had heard of Fyodor's book when I wrote my review of Nmap in the Enterprise last month, but I wasn't consciously considering what could be in Fyodor's version compared to the Syngress title. Although the copy I read was labelled "Pre-Release Beta Version," I was very impressed by this book. In short, if you are looking for the book on Nmap, the search is over: NNS is a winner.

I've reviewed dedicated "tool" books before, including titles about Snort, Nessus, and Nagios. NNS dives into the internals of Nmap unlike any other title I've read. Without Nmap author Fyodor as the author, I think any competitor would need to have thoroughly read the source code of the application to have a chance at duplicating the level of detail Fyodor includes in NNS. Instead of just describing how to use Nmap, Fyodor explains how Nmap works. Going even further, he describes the algorithms used to implement various tests, and why he chose those approaches. The "Idle Scan Implementation Algorithsm" section in Ch 5 is a great example of this sort of material. I will probably just refer students of my TCP/IP Weapons School class to this part of NNS when we discuss the technique!

One of the best parts of NNS, mentioned by explained in no other text, is the Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE). Ch 9 is all about NSE, with a brief intro to Lua and excellent documentation of using and building upon NSE. Beyond this groundbreaking material readers will find many examples of Nmap case studies from users. This and other sections help make NNS a practical book, showing how people use Nmap in their environments for a variety of purposes.

NNS is a five star book, and when it's posted at Amazon.com I'll upload this review there. You can learn more about the book at nmap.org/book, and see it in paper at Def Con next month.

Dark Visitor Podcast: Real "Truth About Chinese Hackers"

I just listened to the first edition of the Dark Visitor Podcast. You may remember my February post titled Review of The Dark Visitor, where I discussed a book by the The Dark Visitor Blog author Scott Henderson. In the podcast, fellow blogger Jumper speaks with Henderson (aka "Heike" on the blog) about various issues related to Chinese hackers. The pair make it clear that they base their posts on "open sources," meaning information available to anyone with a Web browser and an understanding of the Chinese language.

Chinese hackers are a hot topic. The latest Information Security Magazine features a "face-off" between Marcus Ranum and Bruce Schneier on the subject. I think you would learn more reading the Dark Visitor Blog regularly. For example, they responded directly to Bruce Schneier's thesis.

I think anyone who likes my blog will enjoy listening to this new podcast. If anyone knows of a similar English-language site covering Russian and/or east European hackers, please let me know.