"The specified uptodateness vector is corrupt."

I haven't posted in awhile.  Time to get back into the swing of things with a little pre-Christmas Season silliness.  Occasionally, the practice of network security makes us all a little goofy. Seemingly random pursuits overtake us. Silly thoughts fill our console. Perhaps this is a result of low light in the northern latitudes this time of year...In any event, should use wish to query all of the messages available in the "net helpmsg" file on Windows Vista, you can run a command like this:

for /l %i in (1,1,16000) do @( echo %i && net helpmsg %i ) 2>NUL

This will give a formatted output of every existing net help msg and all numbers that are not so.. Keep in mind that there are most probably less than 5000 of these messages, however they are numbered somewhat inconsistently in the sequence between 1 - 16,000. With cygwin or GNUWin32 utilities loaded you could add:

for /l %i in (1,1,16000) do @( echo %i && net helpmsg %i ) 2>NUL | egrep -B 2 -i [a-z] | tr -d /-/- | tr -d \r

This would produce a long list of only those numbers with messages and, after some substantial period of time and processor use, would yield some very interesting reading. Here are a few of my favorites:

581
A Windows Server has an incorrect configuration.

593
NTVDM encountered a hard error.

597
The parameter(s) passed to the server in the clientserver shared memory window were invalid. Too much data may have been put in the shared memory window.

598
The stream is not a tiny stream.

611
There is an IP address conflict with another system on the network

612
There is an IP address conflict with another system on the network

615
The policy of your user account does not allow you to change passwords too frequently.
This is done to prevent users from changing back to a familiar, but potentially discovered, password.
If you feel your password has been compromised then please contact your administrator immediately to have a new one assigned.

617
You have attempted to change your password to one that you have used in the past.
The policy of your user account does not allow this. Please select a password that you have not previously used.

629
A group marked use for deny only cannot be enabled.

670
WOW Assertion Error.

677
{Too Much Information}
The specified access control list (ACL) contained more information than was expected.

678
This warning level status indicates that the transaction state already exists for the registry subtree, but that a transaction commit was previously aborted.
The commit has NOT been completed, but has not been rolled back either (so it may still be committed if desired).

680
{GUID Substitution}
During the translation of a global identifier (GUID) to a Windows security ID (SID), no administrativelydefined GUID prefix was found.
A substitute prefix was used, which will not compromise system security. However, this may provide a more restrictive access than intended.

704
{Redundant Read}
To satisfy a read request, the NT faulttolerant file system successfully read the requested data from a redundant copy.
This was done because the file system encountered a failure on a member of the faulttolerant volume, but was unable to reassign the failing area of the device.

705
{Redundant Write}
To satisfy a write request, the NT faulttolerant file system successfully wrote a redundant copy of the information.
This was done because the file system encountered a failure on a member of the faulttolerant volume, but was not able to reassign the failing area of the device.

730
The system has awoken

746
{Connect Failure on Primary Transport}
An attempt was made to connect to the remote server hs on the primary transport, but the connection failed.
The computer WAS able to connect on a secondary transport.

1265
The system detected a possible attempt to compromise security. Please ensure that you can contact the server that authenticated you.

1274
The group policy framework should call the extension in the synchronous foreground policy refresh.

1282
The system detected an overrun of a stackbased buffer in this application. This overrun could potentially allow a malicious user to gain control of this application.

1292
An operation attempted to exceed an implementationdefined limit.

1349
The type of the token is inappropriate for its attempted use.

1350
Unable to perform a security operation on an object that has no associated security.

1353
The domain was in the wrong state to perform the security operation.

1370
An internal security database corruption has been encountered.

1384
During a logon attempt, the user's security context accumulated too many security IDs.

2228
There are too many names in the user accounts database.

2385
The Run server you requested is paused.

2431
The alert table is full.

3013
The printer driver is known to be unreliable.

3014
The printer driver is known to harm the system.

3029
Local security could not be started because the user accounts database
(NET.ACC) was missing or corrupted, and no usable backup
database was present.

THE SYSTEM IS NOT SECURE.

3060
The service did not respond to control and was stopped with
the DosKillProc function.

3194
Hanging up a stuck session to ***.

3413
Your logon time at *** ends at ***.
Please clean up and log off.

3513
More data is available than can be returned by Windows.

3950
Reissue the given operation as a cached IO operation

4006
Replication with a nonconfigured partner is not allowed.

6628
Log space is exhausted.

6730
The transaction does not have a superior enlistment.

8606
Insufficient attributes were given to create an object. This object may not exist because it may have been deleted and already garbage collected.

8629
The specified uptodateness vector is corrupt.

8630
The request to replicate secrets is denied.

10038
An operation was attempted on something that is not a socket.

10059
Too many references to some kernel object.

10107
A system call that should never fail has failed.

11007
There are no senders.

11008
There are no receivers.

15250
The requested system device cannot be identified due to multiple indistinguishable devices potentially matching the identification criteria.

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Real Security Is Threat-Centric

Apparently there's been a wave of house burglaries in a nearby town during the last month. As you might expect, local residents responded by replacing windows with steel panels, front doors with vault entrances, floors with pressure-sensitive plates, and whatever else "security vendors" recommended. Town policymakers created new laws to mandate locking doors, enabling alarm systems, and creating scorecards for compliance. Home builders decided they needed to adopt "secure building" practices so all these retrofitted measures were "built in" future homes.

Oh wait, this is the real world! All those vulnerability-centric measures I just described are what too many "security professionals" would recommend. Instead, police identified the criminals and arrested them. From Teen burglary ring in Manassas identified:

Two suspects questioned Friday gave information about the others, police said.

Now this crew is facing prosecution. That's a good example of what we need to do in the digital world: enable and perform threat-centric security. We won't get there until we have better attribution, and interestingly enough attribution is the word I hear most often from people pondering improvements in network security.

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Celebrate FreeBSD 8.0 Release with Donation

With the announcement of FreeBSD 8.0, it seems like a good time to donate to the FreeBSD Foundation, a US 501(c)3 charity. The Foundation funds and manages projects, sponsors FreeBSD events, Developer Summits and provides travel grants to FreeBSD developers. It also provides and helps maintain computers and equipment that support FreeBSD development and improvements.

I just donated $100. Will anyone match me? Thank you!

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Historical Video on AFCERT circa 2000

I just uploaded a video that some readers might find entertaining. This video shows the United States Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) in 2000. Kelly AFB, Security Hill, and Air Intelligence Agency appear. The colonel who leads the camera crew into room 215 is James Massaro, then commander of the Air Force Information Warfare Center. The old Web-based interface to the Automated Security Incident Measurement (ASIM) sensor is shown, along with a demo of the "TCP reset" capability to terminate TCP-based sessions.

We have a classic quote about a "digital Pearl Harbor" from Winn Schwartau, "the nation's top information security analyst." Hilarious, although Winn nails the attribution and national leadership problems; note also the references to terrorists in this pre-9/11 video. "Stop the technology madness!" Incidentally, if the programs shown were "highly classified," they wouldn't be in this video!

I was traveling for the AFCERT when this video was shot, so luckily I am not seen anywhere...

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Tort Law on Negligence

If any lawyers want to contribute to this, please do. In my post Shodan: Another Step Towards Intrusion as a Service, some comments claim "negligence" as a reason why intruders aren't really to blame. I thought I would share this case from Tort Law, page 63:

In Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 All ER 48 the claimant, a householder, employed the defendant, a painter. The claimant had to be absent from his house for a while and he left the defendant working there alone. Later, the defendant went out for two hours leaving the front door unlocked. He had been warned by the claimant to lock the door whenever he left the house.

While the house was empty someone entered it by the unlocked front door and stole some of the claimant's posessions. The defendant was held liable for the claimant's loss for, although the criminal action of a third party was involved, the possibility of theft from an unlocked house was one which should have occurred to the defendant.

So, the painter was liable. However, that doesn't let the thief off the hook. If the police find the thief, they will still arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate him. The painter won't serve part of the thief's jail time, even though the painter was held liable in this case. So, even in the best case scenario for those claiming "negligence" for vulnerable systems, it doesn't diminish the intruder's role in the crime.

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Review of Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Amazon.com just posted my three star review of Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. I've reproduced the review in its entirety here because I believe it is important to spread the word to any policy maker who might read this blog or be directed here. I've emphasized a few points for readability.

As background, I am a former Air Force captain who led the intrusion detection operation in the AFCERT before applying those same skills to private industry, the government, and other sectors. I am currently responsible for detection and response at a Fortune 5 company and I train others with hands-on labs as a Black Hat instructor. I also earned a master's degree in public policy from Harvard after graduating from the Air Force Academy.

Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (CAC) is a weighty discussion of the policy considerations of digital defense and attack. He is clearly conversant in non-cyber national security history and policy, and that knowledge is likely to benefit readers unfamiliar with Cold War era concepts. Unfortunately, Libicki's lack of operational security experience undermines his argument and conclusions. The danger for Air Force leaders and those interested in policy is that they will not recognize that, in many cases, Libicki does not understand what he is discussing. I will apply lessons from direct experience with digital security to argue that Libicki's framing of the "cyberdeterrence" problem is misguided at best and dangerous at worst.

Libicki's argument suffers five key flaws. First, in the Summary Libicki states "cyberattacks are possible only because systems have flaws" (p xiii). He continues with "there is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace... It is only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of warfare can such a statement be made" (p. xiv). I suppose, then, that there is "no forced entry" when a soldier destroys a door with a rocket, because the owners of the building are vulnerable "to the extent they want to be"? Are aircraft carriers similarly vulnerable to hypersonic cruise missiles because "they want to be"? How about the human body vs bullets?

Second, Libicki's fatal understanding of digital vulnerability is compounded by his ignorance of the role of vendors and service providers in the security equation. Asset owners can do everything in their power to defend their resources, but if an application or implementation has a flaw it's likely only the vendor or service provider who can fix it. Libicki frequently refers to sys admins as if they have mystical powers to completely understand and protect their environments. In reality, sys admins are generally concerned about availability alone, since they are often outsourced to the lowest bidder and contract-focused, or understaffed to do anything more than keep the lights on.

Third, this "blame the victim" mentality is compounded by the completely misguided notions that defense is easy and recovery from intrusion is simple. On p 144 he says "much of what militaries can do to minimize damage from a cyberattack can be done in days or weeks and with few resources." On p 134 he says that, following cyberattack, "systems can be set straight painlessly." Libicki has clearly never worked in a security or IT shop at any level. He also doesn't appreciate how much the military relies on civilian infrastructure from everything to logistics to basic needs like electricity. For example, on p 160 he says "Militaries generally do not have customers; thus, their systems have little need to be connected to the public to accomplish core functions (even if external connections are important in ways not always appreciated)." That is plainly wrong when one realizes that "the public" includes contractors who design, build, and run key military capabilities.

Fourth, he makes a false distinction between "core" and "peripheral" systems, with the former controlled by users and the later by sys admins. He says "it is hard to compromise the core in the same precise way twice, but the periphery is always at risk" (p 20). Libicki is apparently unaware that one core Internet resource, BGP, is basically at constant risk of complete disruption. Other core resources, DNS and SSL, have been incredibly abused during the last few years. All of these are known problems that are repeatedly exploited, despite knowledge of their weaknesses. Furthermore, Libicki doesn't realize that so-called critical systems are often more fragile that user systems. In the real world, critical systems often lack change management windows, or are heavily regulated, or are simply old and not well maintained. What's easier to reconfigure, patch, or replace, a "core" system that absolutely cannot be disrupted "for business needs," or a "peripheral" system that belongs to a desk worker?

Fifth, in addition to not understanding defense, Libicki doesn't understand offense. He has no idea how intruders think or the skills they bring to the arena. On pp 35-6 he says "If sufficient expenditures are made and pains are taken to secure critical networks (e.g., making it impossible to alter operating parameters of electric distribution networks from the outside), not even the most clever hacker could break into such a system. Such a development is not impossible." Yes, it is impossible. Thirty years of computer security history have shown it to be impossible. One reason why he doesn't understand intruders appears on p 47 where he says "private hackers are more likely to use techniques that have been circulating throughout the hacker community. While it is not impossible that they have managed to generate a novel exploit to take advantage of a hitherto unknown vulnerability, they are unlikely to have more than one." This baffling statement shows Libicki doesn't appreciate the skill set of the underground.

Libicki concludes on pp xiv and xix-xx "Operational cyberwar has an important niche role, but only that... The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area... cyberdefense remains the Air Force's most important activity within cyberspace." He also claims it is not possible to "disarm" cyberwarriors, e.g., on p 119 "one objective that cyberwar cannot have is to disarm, much less destroy, the enemy. In the absence of physical combat, cyberwar cannot lead to the occupation of territory." This focus on defense and avoiding offense is dangerous. It may not be possible to disable a country's potential for cyberwar, but an adversary can certainly target, disrupt, and even destroy cyberwarriors. Elite cyberwarriors could be likened to nuclear scientists in this respect; take out the scientists and the whole program suffers.

Furthermore, by avoiding offense, Libicki makes a critical mistake: if cyberwar has only a "niche role," how is a state supposed to protect itself from cyberwar? In Libicki's world, defense is cheap and easy. In the real world, the best defense is 1) informed by offense, and 2) coordinated with offensive actions to target and disrupt adversary offensive activity. Libicki also focuses far too much on cyberwar in isolation, while real-world cyberwar has historically accompanied kinetic actions.

Of course, like any good consultant, Libicki leaves himself an out on p 177 by stating "cyberweapons come relatively cheap. Because a devastating cyberattack may facilitate or amplify physical operations and because an operational cyberwar capability is relatively inexpensive (especially if the Air Force can leverage investments in CNE), an offensive cyberwar capability is worth developing." The danger of this misguided tract is that policy makers will be swayed by Libicki's misinformed assumptions, arguments, and conclusions, and believe that defense alone is a sufficient focus for 21st century digital security. In reality, a kinetically weaker opponent can leverage a cyber attack to weaken a kinetically superior yet net-centric adversary. History shows, in all theatres, that defense does not win wars, and that the best defense is a good offense.

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Shodan: Another Step Towards Intrusion as a Service

If you haven't seen Shodan yet, you're probably not using Twitter as a means to stay current on security issues. Shoot, I don't even follow anyone and I heard about it.

Basically a programmer named John Matherly scanned a huge swath of the Internet for certain TCP ports (80, 21, 23 at least) and published the results in a database with a nice Web front-end. This means you can put your mind in Google hacking mode, find vulnerable platforms, maybe add in some default passwords (or not), and take over someone's system. We're several steps along the Intrusion as a Service (IaaS) path already!

Incidentally, this idea is not new. I know at least one company that sold a service like this in 2004. The difference is that Shodan is free and open to the public.

Shodan is a dream for those wanting to spend Thanksgiving looking for vulnerable boxes, and a nightmare for their owners. I would not be surprised if shodan.surtri.com disappears in the next few days after receiving a call or two from TLAs or LEAs or .mil's. I predict a mad scramble by intruders during the next 24-48 hours as they use Shodan to locate, own, and secure boxes before others do.

Matt Franz asked good questions about this site in his post Where's the Controversy about Shodan? Personally I think Shodan will disappear. Many will argue that publishing information about systems is not a problem. We hear similar arguments from people defending sites that publish torrents. Personally I don't have a problem with Shodan or torrent sites. From a personal responsibility issue it would have been nice to delay notification of Shodan until after Thanksgiving.

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